

Do competitive voucher schemes improve the provision of health care to underserved and/or vulnerable population groups?

Experiences from Nicaragua, India and Africa



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
Voucher distribution to adolescents

- 1. Instituto CentroAmericano de la Salud – ICAS**
- 2. University of California – Berkeley**

Seminar, Department of Social Medicine, University of Bristol, April 24, 2008

Outline of presentation

- Demand-side versus supply-side subsidies
- What are **competitive voucher schemes**
- **Potential strengths** of vouchers in developing countries
- **History** of voucher schemes in health
- **Experiences** from Nicaragua, Asia and Africa
- **Discussion:** do vouchers improve provision of health care to underserved and/or vulnerable population groups?



Demand Side Subsidies

Consumer-led versus Provider-led

CONSUMER-LED

- The subsidy is transferred to the client, either in advance of service provision, or post-hoc as a refund

PROVIDER-LED

- The subsidy is given to the provider based on a contractual arrangement with the funding agent

Examples of consumer-led subsidy schemes

TRANSFERRED BEFORE SERVICE PROVISION

- Cash transfer payments
- Contributions to family medical savings schemes
- **Vouchers**
 - **Competitive**
 - **Non-competitive**

TRANSFERRED AFTER SERVICE PROVISION

- Cash refunds
- **Conditional cash transfer (incentive based voucher)**

Demand side financing compared to *Supply side financing*

**Demand Side
Financing**

**Supply Side
Financing**

E.g. Competitive
Vouchers Scheme

**Current System
(Inputs)**

High ← ————— **Provider Competition** ————— → **No**

Good ← ————— **Targeting** ————— → **Poor**

High ← ————— **Choice** ————— → **Low/No**

High ← ————— **Consumer Empowerment** ————— → **Low/No**

What is a voucher

A document which can be exchanged for defined goods or medical services as a token of payment

OR

**"Tied cash
(as opposed to liquid cash)"**

Some examples of vouchers

प्रसव पूर्व जांच



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जांच के दौरान महिला की स्थिति



स्वस्थ



अस्वस्थ

10/- रुपये

प्रसव पूर्व जांच



जांच के दौरान महिला की स्थिति

तीसरी जांच



स्वस्थ



अस्वस्थ

10/- रुपये

Mother's Name: _____

Address: _____

Ante Metal Card no: _____

Date: _____

K15,000 OFF

Mobil Oil Zambiya offers you this discount voucher on an Insecticide Treated Mat. Only KO-Mat, Fox Net and Iconet. (This with the HerMark logo of quality are eligible for a discount, valid until June 30, 2008.)

Place Sticker Here

Trader's name: _____

Address: _____

Telephone no: _____ Date: _____

Mobil We're drivers too.



LOOK FOR THIS LOGO ON PARTICIPATING STORES AND NETS






This voucher can be exchanged at any Mobil Mart, chemical shop or any trading store carrying the HerMark logo.

TO THE RETAILER: Please allow K15,000 of the price of one KO-Mat, Fox Net or Iconet carrying the HerMark Logo. At the time of trade, dealer must provide the amount of pure sum equal to the price of the goods from the ITM package and attach it to the voucher. Only vouchers with proof of purchase sticker will be honored. ISSUE OF THE VOUCHER CONSIDERS FINAL.

This offer expires on June 30, 2008.

No. 102-031506
पीएनसी - [1] [2]

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नियमित जांच
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शिफि: _____

डॉक्टर का नाम _____
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BONO

Este BONO se puede usar en:

- ✓ Clinica Popol-Ne
- ✓ Clinica Los Robles
- ✓ Clinicas de Sí Mujer
- ✓ Clinicas de Profamilia
- ✓ Centro Medico Sarrias
- ✓ Empresa De Servicios Medicos
- ✓ Clinica Sacuanjoche (antes Intermédica)

0690

Programa de BONOS para la salud de la mujer

Examples of vouchers in other sectors

- Education (US, Europe, LA, Netherlands)
- Employment (Argentina, US, Netherlands)
- Training (LA, Kenya, Zimbabwe, USA)
- Elderly care (Spain)
- Housing (USA)
- Pension (Bolivia)
- Welfare (UK, USA)

Why use vouchers in health?

- **Market failure** to serve certain poor, marginalised and / or vulnerable populations,
- even if services are associated with **positive externalities** (treatment also benefit others), eg:
 - Infectious diseases
 - e.g. STI-HIV-AIDS services for sex workers
 - Family planning
 - Safe motherhood services


Some examples of non-competitive vouchers

- Increasing **access to mother and child care** for poor to public health services (Cambodia, China)
- Increasing **access to reproductive health care** for poor to an NGO clinic (Dominican Republic)
- Creating a **needle exchange program** for intravenous drug users at pharmacies (China, Vietnam)
- Ensuring **partner referral** of patients with STIs (Central African Republic)
- **Research** eg. in breast screening (USA)

History of competitive vouchers

- Taiwan: **one of the earliest**, access to family planning ('64-'69)
- USA: **Migrant farmers** programs to fill gaps of access to primary health care (since 1983)
- **Pilots** of several voucher programs in the nineties
 - Kenya, **adolescent** sexual and reproductive health ('98-2000)
 - India, primary health care for **slum dwellers** ('99)
 - Indonesia, **Safe Motherhood** '98-2004 (private midwives Java)
 - Tanzania: Discount for **Insecticide Treated Nets** ('97-'99)
 - Nicaragua: voucher trial (1995 to 1998) with sex workers was **successful**, development of **more schemes**

Competitive voucher scheme



Strengths of competitive vouchers

- **Targeting** of population sub-groups
- Encourage **use** of specific services
- Can increase operating **efficiency**
- Can improve service **standards** / quality
- Payment for services **actually** provided
 - Possible to pay only incremental cost
- Facilitates **monitoring** and **evaluation**

Targeting

Of identifiable groups which are vulnerable and often underserved:

- **Marginalised** groups
 - drug-addicts, sex workers, street youth
- **Groups who fear stigmatization**
 - MSM, or people with TB, Leprosy, AIDS
- **Vulnerable** groups, e.g. because of age, gender, behaviour or poverty
 - Adolescents, young people
 - Clients of sex workers (incl. mobile groups, e.g. truck drivers)
 - Poor pregnant women in rural areas

Empower the consumer and thereby encourage use

When demand is limited by barriers to access (cost, lack of knowledge, stigma..)

- Vouchers **inform** about services and **guide** users to where services can be obtained
- **Remove cost barriers** (incl. eg transport costs)
- Power of choice increases **client satisfaction**
 - Encourages use, positive experience leads to repeat use
 - 'Worth of mouth' recommendation to others

Nicaraguan schemes **target** those most at risk or underserved & **encourage use**

■ **STI-HIV-AIDS prevention & treatment**

- **sex workers and their clients**
- **men who have sex with men**
- **Glue-sniffing youth**

■ **Sexual & Reproductive Health care**

- **poor adolescents and young people**

■ **Cervical Cancer screening and treatment**

- **older women in rural and remote areas**

Other schemes target and encourage use of safe motherhood services

Providing safe motherhood through vouchers to reduce maternal mortality (MDG5):

- Kenya: **public, private, NGO & mission hospitals** (poor women)
- India / Gujarat: **private gynaecologists** (poor women from remote areas)
- India / Uttar Pradesh: **private nursing homes** (poor women)

New schemes:

- Bangladesh: **public, private & NGO providers** (poor women)
- Cambodia: **public & private providers** (poor women)

Vouchers can increase efficiency & improve service standards

- Increased utilization of **private sector** resources (non-profit and for-profit)
- Reduced **input costs**
- **Competition** between participating providers (private, NGO, faith based, public) :
 - Reduced price
 - Increased service quality
 - Increased clients satisfaction

When do vouchers increase efficiency / standards most?

- Providers with **excess capacity**; increased utilization gives economies of scale
- **Strong competition** between providers (more than one provider available)
- Where **contracts specify** 'best practice' service package & staff required to undergo training
- only **cost-effective** services are provided
- medical supplies are **procured centrally**
- vouchers are distributed by **third parties**

Vouchers facilitate monitoring and evaluation

Mechanics of vouchers incorporate:

- Regular monitoring of **provider performance** against contract specifications
 - Interviews with redeemers, 'mystery patients'
 - Medical record review
 - Tracking redemption rates / follow-up consultations
- **Providers report** to voucher agency

Program impact assessed by tracking voucher use and linking changes to health outcomes

Schemes to be discussed and their financing

- **Migrant Farmer** scheme - US Government
- **Nicaragua** – many different donors
- **India Gujarat** – State government
- **Uganda** – KfW (German Development Bank) and Global Programme on Output-based Aid (WB)
- **Kenya** – KfW
- **India, Uttar Pradesh**, Agra scheme – USAID
- **Cambodia** – Government and KfW
- [*Bangladesh* – Government (TA by donors)]

Migrant Farmer – US

“Born out of necessity” in 1983

- Where number of migrant patients is **too low** for full scale migrant health clinic
- **Primary health care** for underserved at public, NGO or private providers contracted in advance
- 21 programs serving over 100,000 migrants
- Some **benefits** mentioned by staff:
 - Vouchers “make **private providers part of the continuum of care**”
 - Private MDs often report **great satisfaction** working with migrants
 - Migrants **learn to negotiate** the healthcare system
 - Encourages **creativity** as staff networks with public and private providers and negotiates prices

Migrant Farmer Programme Outreach Workers Illinois



Nicaraguan HIV voucher scheme started 1995

- To detain the development of a **HIV epidemic**
- Financed by **many donors** (UK, NL, US, NGOs, GF), Government no role, **NGO is voucher agency**
- Reaches **highly stigmatised** populations:
 - Sex workers, clients, MSM, glue-sniffing young people
- Mostly **NGO clinics**, some private / public providers in more remote areas
- STI services, HIV testing, over 20,000 consultations
- **Difficulties maintaining of funding**
- Experiences used to write the **Guide to Competitive Vouchers in Health**

Stigmatised populations




Sex worker in brothel, Managua



Glue-sniffing youth, market Managua

Impact of treatment rounds on STI prevalence in sex workers voucher scheme in Nicaragua (long periods between treatment rounds – high bounce back of STIs)




Gujarat scheme (2005)

“Chiranjeevi Yojana” (long life)

- To reduce **maternal mortality** among poor
- Developed by **state Government** (high level commitment) after many failed attempts to reduce maternal mortality through supply-side
- Facilitated by technical assistance Academic Institutions, NGOs and GTZ
- Over 800 **private obstetricians** in rural areas
- Voucher is the **BPL Card** (Below Poverty Line)
- Started in 5 pilot districts

Impact of voucher pilot Gujarat

Over 40,000 Institutional Deliveries in 5 pilot districts, Jan 2006 – March 2007



Dr. A Singh, Voucher Workshop April 2007, Gurgaon, India

Cont. Gujarat scheme

- Since 2007 **state-wide**
- Over 160,000 deliveries
- **Coverage** of deliveries increased **27% to 48%**
- Expected deaths 642, **real deaths 32**
- Costs: 3.6 % of total state health budget
- More efficient to **harness private MDs** than wait for supply side improvements in public sector
- Development of **health markets in rural areas**

Uganda vouchers (2006-2010) Output-Based Aid (OBA)

- To treat **high burden of STIs** general population
- **Unattended pregnancies** in poor women
- **Output-based contract with private clinics**
 - Negotiated fee-for-service
 - Clinics must satisfy accreditation requirements
 - Clinics must comply with service delivery guidelines
- Vouchers are sold at a **highly subsidized price**
- Vouchers **marketed with health information to clients with STI complaints**

**Marie Stopes International Uganda (MSI-U)
& Microcare Insurance Ltd.**

Pay service provider

Submit claims

Record voucher sales data

Send vouchers

**Clinics
(16 at start)**

**Community distributors
(44 at start)**

Submit voucher to provider

Provide STI diagnosis and treatment


Pay cash

Buy vouchers

**Clients
(+350 per month)**

avg 30 days
max 60 days

avg 15 days
max 45 days



Evaluation of OBA in Uganda

- **Population surveys** of 2600 respondents before and 16 months after launch (analysis will be available late 2008)
- **Clinic-based records review** to determine utilization and cost-effectiveness
 - In first 18 months over **17,000 STI patients**
 - Clinic review July 2007 found **200% increase** in utilization at contracted clinics
 - **7%** of adults in pilot districts had recent **syphilis** infection
- **Cost-effectiveness** will be assessed July 2008

Future of Uganda OBA

- STI vouchers will continue
- Program is **expanding** to include Safe Deliveries (June 2008). Program will cover additional districts with goal of delivering 100,000 babies a year for the next 3.5 years
- Program serves as model for Ministry of Health as it considers **mechanisms** for **effective service delivery** and possible **social insurance**

Kenya voucher scheme

June 2006-KfW

- **Poor** in 3 rural districts, 2 urban slums Nairobi
- To increase access to **safe motherhood, family planning and gender violence recovery**
- Public, private, faith-based and NGO providers
- Voucher agency is PriceWaterhouseCoopers
- Vouchers are sold at **highly subsidized prices**
- Over 40,000 vouchers sold (specifically **safe motherhood** vouchers successful, other much less)
- Extension planned with 10 million Euro
- Seen as catalyst for a National Social Health **Insurance Scheme**

Uttar Pradesh, India

Agra voucher scheme (2007)

- **UP: highest Maternal Mortality** of India
- **Targets BPL families**
- **Voucher management: CMO-ANM-NGOs**
- **Village Health Worker** distributes vouchers
- **3 districts: private provider, 1 district: public**
- **Expected to attend 6,500 pregnant women, over 3,000 for FP and 8,000 STIs in 2 years**

The first voucher baby Rachna



Cambodia 2007 and 2009

- **Successful non-competitive voucher** scheme in Kampong Cham province (Feb 2007):
 - Targeting poor pregnant women
 - Reduced financial barrier to deliver at facility
- **New competitive scheme** financed by KfW
 - Kampong Cham and two other provinces
 - **Safe deliveries, abortions, family planning** for poor
 - Reduce maternal mortality, development of **regulatory framework** (accreditation, quality assurance) for public and private health providers

Some potential drawbacks of vouchers

- High **start-up costs**
- Set-up is **complex** (devil is in the detail), needs highly trained staff at start
- **Not feasible** when cost of services is variable or unpredictable or need for services difficult to verify
- May be susceptible to **abuse** (black market, collusion between providers and distributors..)
- Program development may take **time**

However once established **easy to run** and to scale-up, and costs go down

Lessons from experiences when seem vouchers to be successful?

- **Appropriate design, committed stakeholders**
- **Independent Voucher Management Agency and “non-bureaucratic” management procedures**
 - smooth payment of providers
 - non-stigmatising distribution of vouchers
 - able to adapt to new knowledge/circumstances etc
- **Tap into private sector resources and engage private providers in serving needy populations with services they were unable to obtain before**

Cont.

when seem vouchers to be successful?

- Vouchers address **priority needs**
- Vouchers address the **specific barriers** (money, information, stigma, age etc)
- Free service or **appropriate price / discount**
- **Competition** (within or for the market)
- Service **costs not too variable** or unpredictable

When are vouchers considered useful

- **Top 1:** to assist populations who are currently **underserved and vulnerable** to specific health threats or don't receive services with important positive externalities (e.g. STI/HIV services)
- **Top 2:** to change the way health sector financing works and **use private sector capacity**
- **Top 3:** to set the tone for the introduction of health insurance schemes

Conclusion

Vouchers are useful for the provision of health care to vulnerable and/or underserved populations

Currently only experience with clearly defined packages of priority services, targeted at underserved populations

After pilot phase in nineties, now larger schemes underway....and impact and cost-effectiveness studies

Great potential in e.g.:

- Reduction of maternal mortality in poor women
- STI services and HIV/AIDS prevention in groups most at risk
- Increase of coverage of family planning